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In the last years, research on risky choice has moved beyond analyzing choices only. Mod-
els have been suggested that aim to describe the underlying cognitive processes and
some studies have tested process predictions of these models. Prominent approaches are
evidence accumulation models such as decision field theory (DFT), simple serial heuristic
models such as the adaptive toolbox, and connectionist approaches such as the parallel
constraint satisfaction (PCS) model. In two studies involving measures of attention and
pupil dilation, we investigate hypotheses derived from these models in choices between
two gambles with two outcomes each. We show that attention to an outcome of a gamble
increases with its probability and its value and that attention shifts toward the subsequently
favored gamble after about two thirds of the decision process, indicating a gaze-cascade
effect. Information search occurs mostly within-gambles, and the direction of search does
not change over the course of decision making. Pupil dilation, which reflects both cogni-
tive effort and arousal, increases during the decision process and increases with mean
expected value. Overall, the results support aspects of automatic integration models for
risky choice such as DFT and PCS, but in their current specification none of them can
account for the full pattern of results.
Keywords: risky choices, decision field theory, heuristics, parallel constraint satisfaction, eye tracking, arousal,
gaze-cascade effect
INTRODUCTION
In many every day decisions individuals choose between options
with different outcomes, each of which realizes with a certain
probability. Conceptually, such risky choices can be reduced to
decisions between gambles with monetary outcomes. Research in
risky choice has a long tradition, and several models have been
developed to account for the wealth of identified choice anomalies
and data observed on risky choices in the lab and the field. Many of
these models are extensions and refinements of the expected util-
ity (EU) Model (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Edwards,
1954; Savage, 1954) assuming that some kind of integration of
payoff and probability of outcomes drives individuals’ choice.
Cumulative prospect theory (CPT, Tversky and Kahneman, 1992),
and the transfer-of-attention exchange model (Birnbaum, 2008a)
are two of the most prominent models of this class. One important
limitation of these models, however, is that they predict choices
only and remain largely silent concerning the processes underlying
choice (Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Luce, 2000).
PROCESS MODELS FOR RISKY CHOICE
The importance of investigating the underlying processes in more
depth and of developing process models, however, has been high-
lighted repeatedly (e.g., Payne et al., 1988; Johnson et al., 2008;
Franco-Watkins and Johnson, 2011; Schulte-Mecklenbeck et al.,
2011). Two important classes of existing process models are sim-
plifying heuristic models and automatic integration models. Sim-
plifying heuristic models assume that individuals try to avoid
integrating all pieces of information and apply short-cuts instead.
According to a satisficing heuristics, for example, one could choose
the first gamble that meets the criteria for adequacy on all out-
comes (Simon, 1955, 1956). Alternatively, one might apply a mini-
max heuristic or a maximax heuristic, by choosing the gamble
which is better then all alternatives concerning its worst outcome,
or better in the best outcome,respectively. Persons might also apply
a strategy that tests a sequence of such “reasons” as assumed by the
priority heuristic (PH; Brandstätter et al., 2006). PH assumes that
individuals compare reasons in the order: minimum outcomes
(higher is better), probability of the minimum outcome (lower
is better), and maximum outcome (higher is better). Participants
consider these reasons in turn, make their decision as soon as a
reason discriminates between the gambles, and decide in line with
this reason.
Automatic integration models, in contrast, assume that indi-
viduals rely on powerful cognitive processes that allow integration
of much information very quickly and efficiently (Schneider and
Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977). Examples for auto-
matic integration models in the domain of risky choice are evi-
dence accumulation models such as decision field theory (DFT,
Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993; Johnson and Busemeyer, 2005),
and the leaky competing accumulator model (Usher and McClel-
land, 2001, 2004); as well as interactive activation models such
as the parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) model for risky choice
(Glöckner and Herbold,2011; see also Glöckner and Betsch,2008b;
Betsch and Glöckner, 2010). Further automaticity-based evidence
accumulation models that focus on decision making under cer-
tainty but could eventually also be applied to risky decisions
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are multiattributive DFT (e.g., Diederich, 1997, 2003), and the
attention drift-diffusion model (e.g., Krajbich et al., 2010, 2012;
Milosavljevic et al., 2010; Krajbich and Rangel, 2011).
MODEL COMPARISONS AND TESTS OF PROCESS MODELS
A recent comprehensive model comparison indicates that none
of the available simple heuristics (not even when assuming their
adaptive usage) can predict risky choice in decisions between two-
outcome gambles nearly as well as CPT (Glöckner and Pachur,
2012)1. Despite of some initial support for heuristics and par-
ticularly for the PH (Brandstätter et al., 2006), most later stud-
ies have challenged predictions derived from PH and similar
semi-lexicographic heuristics with regard to choices (Birnbaum,
2008b; Birnbaum and LaCroix, 2008; Hilbig, 2008), decision times
(Glöckner and Betsch, 2008a; Ayal and Hochman, 2009; but see
Brandstätter et al., 2006), and information search (Glöckner and
Betsch, 2008a; Johnson et al., 2008).
One study also used eye-tracking to directly compare predic-
tions of PH and automatic integration models with regard to
the process measures (Glöckner and Herbold, 2011). The results
concerning information search, response time, and choice speak
against the usage of PH as well as similar heuristics. The findings,
however, also rule out that individuals use simple serial implemen-
tation of EU models assuming a stepwise calculation of weighted
sums, which is one possible process implementation of EU sug-
gested in previous research (Payne et al., 1988). Instead, results
support automatic integration models such as DFT and PCS in that
mainly short fixations were found,which indicate lower-level auto-
matic processing instead of deliberate calculation (Horstmann
et al., 2009). Furthermore, the decision time and number of fixa-
tions increased for decisions in which differences between gambles
were small. In line with PCS predictions, there was an increase
in the number of fixations to the favored gamble and particu-
larly to the most attractive outcome of this gamble (defined by a
high product of outcome and probability). Furthermore, and in
line with previous studies using mouselab (Glöckner and Betsch,
2008a; Johnson et al., 2008), information search was conducted
mainly within-gambles. Most simple heuristics assume attribute-
wise comparisons between gambles and therefore cannot account
for the information search behavior.
AIM OF THE CURRENT STUDIES
The current paper elaborates the eye-tracking approach by Glöck-
ner and Herbold for detailed investigations of the dynamics in
risky choice, that is, changes of process variables over the time
course of a decision. Furthermore, we investigate changes in pupil
size as further dependent measure which indexes both process-
ing load (Beatty, 1982) and arousal (Partala and Surakka, 2003;
Bradley et al., 2008) and can be informative for cognitive processes
in decision research as well (cf. Franco-Watkins and Johnson,
2011). Finally, we aimed to go beyond Glöckner and Herbold
(2011) by using more detailed analyses of the factors influenc-
ing attention and by additionally addressing the question whether
individuals react rather homogeneously or heterogeneously on
1For important limitations of CPT particularly in predicting choices between
gambles with more than two outcomes see Birnbaum (2006, 2008a,b).
these influence factors. By putting the decision process under the
microscope, we aim to improve our knowledge concerning the
mechanisms underlying risky decision making.
PREVIOUS FINDINGS CONCERNING DYNAMICS AND AROUSAL IN
DECISION MAKING
Some previous studies have investigated the dynamics of deci-
sion making using eye-tracking in situations under certainty (i.e.,
outcomes are certain in contrast to probabilistic). A gaze-cascade
effects, that is the tendency that over the course of decision mak-
ing attention shifts to the chosen option, has been repeatedly
found in these studies. Gaze-cascade effects, have for example
been demonstrated in attractiveness based decisions between faces
(Shimojo et al., 2003) and other kinds of visual decision task (e.g.,
Glaholt and Reingold, 2009a,b). Similarly, a recent eye-tracking
investigation of food choices testing predictions of the attention
drift-diffusion model showed that the last fixated item was cho-
sen more often than the alternative item (Krajbich et al., 2010).
Additionally, it was shown in this study that decision time and the
number of fixations decrease with the increase in the difference in
valuations of the food items measured in a pre-test.
There is one recent eye-tracking paper comparing risky deci-
sions from description and from experience (Glöckner et al.,2012).
The former are decisions between gambles with stated probabili-
ties and outcomes as the ones used in the current study. In deci-
sions from experience, in contrast, no probabilities are provided
and outcomes have to be sampled sequentially (e.g., Camilleri and
Newell, 2011). In the description condition, arousal measured by
pupil dilation and skin conductance response increased with the
average expected value (EV) of the two gambles and with decreas-
ing difference in EV between gambles. This effect was not found
in the experience condition. Based on this study and other stud-
ies showing differences in choice behavior (e.g., Barron and Erev,
2003; Hertwig et al., 2004; Ungemach et al., 2009), we restrict the
current investigation to decisions from description only. Finally
a recent investigation by Franco-Watkins and Johnson (2011)
shows that the pupil dilation increases over the course of the deci-
sion making and is influenced by the presentation format (basic
eye-tracking vs. decision moving-window). Another eye-tracking
study using a somewhat different card gambling task shows that
in situations in which persons can form expectations pupil dila-
tion signals surprise and not expected reward or uncertainty per se
(Preuschoff et al., 2011).
PROCESS MEASURES AND THEORIES
In the following process analysis, we investigate decision time,
number of fixations, distribution of attention, mean fixation dura-
tion, pupil dilation, and direction of information search as depen-
dent measures. First, we investigate these measures in an overall
perspective aggregated over time for entire decisions (i.e., simi-
lar to most analyses in Glöckner and Herbold, 2011). Second, we
look at developments and changes in these variables over the time
course of making a decision by splitting up the decision process in
several parts (i.e., time bins).
DEPENDENT MEASURES
Decision time was measured as the time from the gamble onset to
individuals choice response. The “number of fixations” refers to
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the average fixation count in this period (per decision of each per-
son). The dependent variable “distribution of attention” refers to
the proportion of fixations to specific parts of the screen contain-
ing probability or outcome information, so-called areas of interest
(AOI). AOIs can thereby also be combinations of smaller areas
such as all areas that contain pieces of information belonging to
the left or the right gamble. The variable “mean fixation duration”
refers to the average duration of single fixations in a decision.
Stated differently, it refers to how long each fixation was on aver-
age. It has been shown that mean fixation durations increase with
level of processing in scene perception in driving (Velichkovsky
et al., 2001). This finding generalizes to decision making in that
deliberate processes of calculating weighted sums go along with
long fixations, whereas more intuitive or superficial information
processing is accompanied by shorter fixations (Horstmann et al.,
2009). The dependent variable “pupil dilation” refers to the differ-
ence in pupil size between periods of task processing (i.e., decision
trials) and periods of rest (i.e., intertrial intervals/baseline) as a
measure of arousal and cognitive load. The measure “direction of
search” is defined as proportion of fixation transitions within one
gamble as compared to the sum of transitions within and between
gambles (details see below).
MODELS
In the investigation we particularly consider the models: DFT, PCS,
PH, minimax, maximax, LEX, and (for completeness) a deliber-
ate application of EU which we will refer to as weighted additive
strategy (WADD). These decision strategies are briefly described
in Table 1.
MANIPULATION AND PREDICTIONS
Not all models allow for straightforwardly deriving predic-
tions concerning all dependent variables. Nevertheless, to foster
improvements and specifications of models based on our data, we
tried to derive as many reasonable predictions as possible (for a
detailed discussion of specification and model development see
Glöckner and Betsch, 2011). In cases in which reasonable predic-
tions could be derived on theoretical grounds, we did so even if the
authors of the original models did not explicitly make these predic-
tions (which is of course explicitly acknowledged). Furthermore,
we report data relatively broadly, so that the reader has additionally
the possibility to check his or her own hypotheses.
DECISION TIME AND INFORMATION SEARCH
There are several possibilities to compare models. In the current
paper, we refrain from complex comparative model fitting but use
the classic method of hypothesis testing. We thereby investigate
predictions concerning general differences in dependent variables
as well as predictions concerning the effect of manipulations.
Specifically, we manipulate the mean EV of gambles (EVmean)
and the difference in EVs between gambles (EVdiff). EVmean is
basically a manipulation of the stakes involved in the task. A high
EVmean should increase motivation since participants can win
more money. EVdiff is a measure how similar the gambles are from
a rational perspective, and according to some models it should be
related to the difficulty of choice. Choices between gambles with
very similar EVs are challenging in terms of finding the option
Table 1 | Models for risky choice.
AUTOMATIC INTEGRATION MODELS
Decision field theory (DFT): Decision making is based on a dynamic,
stochastic process. Each moment in the choice process is akin to mentally
sampling one of these outcomes, producing affective reactions to the
imagined result which are added up until a threshold for deciding for one
or the other gamble is reached. Sampling is assumed to reflect the
probabilities present in the stimuli, therefore outcome probabilities dictate
where attention shifts, but only the outcome values are used in
determining the momentary evaluation
Parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS): Decision making is based on a
dynamic process of constructing coherence under parallel consideration of
all constraints given by outcome-probability relations in a decision task
between gambles. In a process akin to Gestalt-construction in perception,
activation of information supporting the favored gamble is automatically
increased, while activation of information speaking for the alternative is
decreased to form a coherent interpretation. The option with the higher
activation feels more attractive and is more likely to be chosen
SIMPLE HEURISTICS
Priority heuristic (PH): Decision making is based on simple set of rules: (1)
Go through reasons in the order of: minimum gain, probability of minimum
gain, and maximum gain. (2) Stop examination if the minimum gains differs
by 1/10 (or more) of the maximum gain; otherwise, stop examination if
probabilities differ by 1/10 (or more) of the probability scale. (3) Choose the
gamble with the more attractive gain (probability)
Minimax: Decision making is based on a simple rule of choosing the
gamble with highest minimum outcome
Maximax: Decision making is based on a simple rule of choosing the
gamble with the highest outcome
Lexicographic (LEX): Determine the most likely outcome of each gamble
and choose the gamble with the better outcome. If both outcomes are
equal, determine the second most likely outcome of each gamble, and
choose the gamble with the better (second most likely) outcome. Proceed
until a decision is reached
SERIAL EXPECTATION MODEL
Weighted additive strategy (WADD). Multiple outcomes by their probability
and add them up for each gamble. Choose the gamble with the higher
sum.
Heuristics are from Brandstätter et al. (2006) and Payne et al. (1993).
with the higher EV whereas in gamble pairs with a high EVdiff
the better alternative is easier recognizable. The process models
considered make quite distinct predictions concerning whether or
not individuals should be influenced by manipulations of these
factors. According to DFT and PCS, decision time and number
of fixations should increase with higher EVmean since this corre-
sponds to an higher internal decision/coherence threshold within
these models. An increase in decision time and number of fixa-
tions would also be predicted for decisions between-gamble pairs
with low EVdiff, as compared to gamble pairs with high EVdiff,
since according to DFT the drift rate towards the threshold is lower
in these cases and according to PCS it is much harder to create a
coherent interpretation of the task. According to heuristics and
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WADD, measures should not be influenced by either manipula-
tion, because strategies apply rather simple decision rules or a
standardized weighting operation, which are independent of these
factors as long as the number of elementary information processes
(EIPs; see Newell and Simon, 1972; Payne et al., 1988) necessary
to apply the strategy is not influenced by the manipulation.
MEAN FIXATION DURATION AND PUPIL DILATION
Increasing EVmean and decreasing (absolute) EVdiff could both
potentially lead to qualitative changes in information processing
in that more thorough, effortful, and deliberate information pro-
cessing is used. Hence, mean fixation duration might increase.
Similarly, individuals might be more aroused and diligent, which
should be reflected in increasing pupil size. DFT and PCS can both
predict the effects of EVmean on pupil size. According to DFT, a
higher EVmean will induce persons to use higher thresholds that
necessitate a higher accumulation of affective responses2. Accord-
ing to PCS, arousal is dependent on the general level of conflict (or
dissonance) in the network (Betsch and Glöckner, 2010; Glöckner
et al., 2012; see also Hochman et al., 2010; Glöckner and Hochman,
2011), which can be measured by the networks Hopfield energy
(Hopfield, 1982; Read et al., 1997). The level of remaining con-
flict mainly depends on two factors: the general activation of the
2The threshold is assumed to model the importance of a decision (e.g., Johnson
and Busemeyer, 2005, p. 847) and arguably subjective importance increases with
the stakes that are in place in a decision. Johnson and Busemeyer (2005, p. 843)
furthermore state that: “Each moment in the DFT choice process is akin to mentally
sampling one of these numbers [i.e., monetary outcomes of gambles], producing
an affective reaction to the imagined result” (explanation in brackets are added).
Everything else being equal (e.g., drift rate), scaling up stakes of a decision should
therefore increase the amount of affective reactions that has to be sampled and
accumulated. Besides this eventual effect of increased accumulation, the increased
size of outcomes per se should lead to increased affective reaction for each sampled
outcome as well. Given the well established link between the (absolute) strength of
affective responses and pupil dilation (e.g., Janisse, 1974), both effects could cause
larger pupil dilations. It, however, has to be acknowledged that the researchers that
suggested DFT have (to the best of our knowledge) not explicitly derived these
predictions concerning arousal from their theory.
network and the structure of the network defined by its’constraints
(i.e., the structure of inhibitory and excitatory links). Increasing
EVmean influences the first factor and leads to higher activation
and therefore also to higher arousal. In the model this would be
captured by the fact that higher a priori valuations of outcomes
result in stronger links between the general valuation node and the
outcome nodes (see Glöckner and Herbold, 2011, Figure 1). Fur-
thermore, PCS predicts increasing pupil size for decreasing EVdiff,
which influences the second factors namely the structure of the
network and makes it harder to construct a coherent interpretation
(Hochman et al., 2010; Glöckner and Hochman, 2011). Heuristics
predictions are less influenced by either manipulation. Individuals
applying heuristics should not be aware of EV as they ignore parts
of the information which would be needed to calculate it. They
could, however, anyway realize that gambles are concerned with
higher stakes by seeing higher outcomes and therefore at least react
to the manipulation of EVmean (see also text footnote 2, above).
DISTRIBUTION OF ATTENTION
Most process models allow predictions concerning the distribution
of attention over outcomes within a decision. For example, LEX,
minimax, and maximax predict that certain outcomes (i.e., low vs.
high outcomes) should receive particularly large amounts of atten-
tion. For individuals applying WADD, in contrast, all outcomes
and probabilities should receive about equal attention. From DFT,
even more refined predictions can be derived in that attention can
be assumed to be proportional to the probability of an outcome
(Busemeyer and Townsend,1993; Johnson and Busemeyer,2005)3.
3According to DFT, attention weights (often equated with probabilities) are assumed
to determine the stochastic sampling process of outcomes. Therefore, “the outcome
probabilities dictate where attention shifts, but only the outcome values are used in
determining the momentary evaluation.” (Johnson and Busemeyer, 2005, p. 843).
Note, however, that DFT in its original formulation is mainly concerned with men-
tally sampling outcomes. Explicit predictions concerning overt attention are only
found in some implementation of simplified evidence accumulation models (e.g.,
Raab and Johnson, 2007), while other authors have argued that the process is not
directly observable (e.g., Diederich, 2003).
 blank screen              fixation cross    
   individual decision times               
< Choose A or B >
   6000 ms                      500 ms
Lottery A Lottery B
 0.4 
9.3 
20%
80%
2.2 
  3.8 
88%
12%
FIGURE 1 | Decision tasks between gambles with two outcomes each used in studies 1 and 2. Left outcomes belong to gamble A, right outcomes belong
to gamble B.
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PCS predicts that attention to outcomes should increase with both
their probability and their value. PCS postulates that activation of
the aspects supporting the later on favored option increases over
time. Therefore, in a dynamic perspective, there should be a shift of
attention toward the chosen options (and particularly to the most
attractive outcomes of it) in the course of decision making. If one
accepts the assumption that internal attention is at least correlated
with overt attention in decisions from descriptions (Just and Car-
penter, 1976), these predictions can be directly investigated in our
fixation data.
DIRECTION OF INFORMATION SEARCH
WADD assumes mainly within-gambles information search.
Heuristics, in contrast, mainly assume information search to be
between gambles. DFT assumes a stochastic process of informa-
tion sampling but does not explicitly specify the direction of
information search. PCS also does not make clear predictions
concerning the direction of information search.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
We conducted two eye-tracking studies to investigate the dynam-
ics of risky choice. The first study used variants of the gambles
taken from a previous study (Glöckner and Betsch, 2008a)4. To
rule out the possibility that results might be dependent on the
selection of these specific decisions, we conducted a second study
using randomly generated gambles. To enhance cross-study com-
parisons, we will jointly report methods and results for both stud-
ies, although the studies were originally conducted in a logically
motivated sequence and with a time lag of more than 1 year.
PARTICIPANTS AND DESIGN
Twenty-four residents of Bonn, most of them students (mean
age: 24.6 years; 47% female), took part in the first study. Three
of them had to be excluded from the analysis because their eye-
tracking data was not recorded. In the second study, 37 participants
took part (mean age: 22.53 years; 65% female). One had to be
excluded because of incomplete eye-tracking data. Participants
were recruited from the MPI Decision Lab subject pool using the
database-system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). In both studies partic-
ipants repeatedly made decisions between two gambles with two
outcomes each. In the first study, for many of the decisions the
compared gambles were almost equal concerning their EV, that is,
their EVdifference was close to zero, but the mean EV was manip-
ulated to be high vs. low (details below). In the second study, mean
EV and EV differences varied randomly between gambles within
a certain pre-specified range.
Both studies lasted about 40 min each including a calibra-
tion phase and a short questionnaire about the decision behavior.
Choices were incentivized. In addition to a fixed show-up fee of 6
C (approx. USD 7.90), participants earned money by playing one
of the chosen lotteries (payoffs ranged from 0 to 49.5 C,M = 6.2C
(approx. USD 8.20) in Study 1 and from 0.1 to 49.8 C, M = 9.6 C
(approx. USD 12.70, in Study 2). No deception was involved, and
4These gambles were also used in further eye-tracking studies by Glöckner and
Herbold (2011) and Franco-Watkins and Johnson (2011) and comparative model
fitting (together with additional gambles) in Glöckner and Pachur (2012).
participants had not experienced deception in previous studies in
our lab.
MATERIAL
Study 1
Participants completed 50 choices between pairs of gambles. The
decision problems used consisted of 40 decision tasks adapted
from Glöckner and Betsch (2008a), and 10 decision tasks taken
from the standard economic test for risk aversion from Holt and
Laury (2002). For the Glöckner-and-Betsch gambles, the mean
EV of both gambles in the decision task was manipulated. For half
of the decisions, the mean EV for both gambles was high (7.50
C≤ EVmean≤ 9.90 C) for the remaining decisions it was low
(2.00C≤ EVmean≤ 3.75C). The compared gambles were thereby
always similar in EV to each other. In the Holt-and-Laury gambles,
in contrast, the absolute difference in EVs between the gambles was
varied gradually [0.32 C≤ EVdiff (abs)≤ 3.7 C]. Specifically, a
safe gamble was compared to a risky gamble with increasing supe-
riority in EV. Mean EV and differences in EVs between the gambles
show a slight negative correlation, r =−0.17, p= 0.23. Decision
tasks are listed in Section “Gambles Study 1” in Appendix.
Study 2
Decision tasks consisted of the 10 Holt-and-Laury gambles, and 40
decision tasks that were randomly generated. They contained pairs
of gambles with varying mean EV (2.04 C≤ EVmean≤ 17.6 C)
and varying the absolute difference in EV between gambles [0.006
C≤ EVdiff (abs)≤ 1.844 C]. Both factors were thereby almost
uncorrelated (r =−0.04). The full list of decision problems can
be found in Section “Gambles Study 2” in Appendix.
PROCEDURE
Both studies essentially used the same procedure. First, partici-
pants were informed about the experimental task, the incentive
scheme, and the presentation format of the gambles. They were
instructed to make good decisions, but to proceed as fast as pos-
sible. Each decision started with a blank screen (6 s), followed by
the fixation cross (0.5 s) to direct attention to the center of the
screen. Then the two gambles were presented simultaneously on
the right and on the left side of the screen. An ellipsoid display
format was used, in which all pieces of information (i.e., outcomes
and probabilities) are present at equal distance from the initial
fixation point (Figure 1). The ellipsoid format has been intro-
duced in previous research, and it has been shown that choices are
not systematically different from other more classic formats (see
Glöckner and Betsch, 2008a; Glöckner and Herbold, 2011). The
left (right) gamble was selected by pressing a key on the left (right)
side of the keyboard (i.e., “y” and “m,” which are the lower left and
right letters, respectively, on German keyboards). Decision tasks
were shown in randomized order. The presentation order of the
gambles (gamble is presented on the left or right side of the screen)
and the order of outcomes within each gamble (i.e., low outcome
first vs. high outcome first) were also chosen according to a fixed
random assignment.
Eye movements and pupil dilations were recorded by using the
eye gaze binocular system (LC Technologies) with remote binocu-
lar sampling rate of 120 Hz and an accuracy of about 0.45˚. Gam-
bles were presented on a monitor (Samsung Synchmaster 740B,
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refresh rate 60 Hz, reaction time 5 ms) with a native resolution of
1280× 1024. Fixations were identified using a 30 pixel tolerance
(i.e., added max-min deviation for x- and y-coordinates) and a
minimum fixation time threshold of 50 ms. For analyses of mean
fixation duration, first and last fixations in each decision trial were
dropped since their length might be contaminated (see Krajbich
et al., 2010; Glöckner and Herbold, 2011), although conclusions
remained the same when including them in the analysis.
Non-overlapping AOI around the presented information on
the screen were defined with the size of 100× 100 pixels. These
AOIs were used to determine which information was searched in
a specific moment.
RESULTS
We first analyze dependent measures aggregated over the entire
time course of decision making. In the second step, we look more
closely at dynamics and systematic changes over time.
AGGREGATED PERSPECTIVE
Choices
First, we were interested in the influence of EVdiff on choices;
therefore we conducted logistic regressions predicting choice for
Gamble A by the difference in EV between Gambles A and B (posi-
tive numbers indicating an advantage of A over B and vice versa for
negative numbers). This and all following regressions use random
effects models to account for the repeated measurement design.
The estimated models include random intercepts and slopes for all
relevant predictors (excluding control factors). Coefficients c are
assumed to vary randomly and independently from each other on
the level of participants around their population mean µC with a
SD of σC following a normal distributionN [µC,σC] (Wooldridge,
2001)5. As a further control factor, we included trial number to
account for order effects. We find coefficients for choosing Gam-
ble A higher than 0, indicating that the probability for choosing
this gamble increases with increasing EV difference in favor of the
gamble (Table 2).
The influence of mean EV and EV difference on information search
and processing
We were first interested in the influence of our manipulations of
EVmean and absolute EVdiff on information search and infor-
mation integration. As dependent measures, we analyzed decision
time, number of fixations, mean fixation duration (excluding first
and last fixations), and pupil dilation. Time was measured from
gamble onset until key-press, so was the number of fixations (i.e.,
count), and the mean fixation duration (i.e., averaged duration
of single fixations over the time-frame). Pupil dilation was calcu-
lated as peak pupil dilation scores, that is, the maximum increase
of pupil size from baseline (measured at blank screen and fixation
cross before each decision) in the same time period. Pupil dilation
is measured as radius in mm. Descriptive statistics for the core
dependent measures are provided in Section “Summary Statistics”
in Appendix.
All dependent measures were regressed on EVmean and
absolute EVdiff using random effects models with random inter-
cepts and random slopes for both predictors and trial as control
5Alternative analyses using fixed effect correction and cluster corrected SE lead to
the same conclusions except where explicitly stated otherwise.
Table 2 | Logistic regression predicting choices for gamble A (pchoiceA).
pchoiceA pchoiceA
Study 1 Study 2
EVdiff(Gamble A−Gamble B)a 0.332*** (4.49) 0.801*** (12.63)
Constant −0.124 (−0.98) 0.227* (2.13)
Observations 1026 1800
Random effects model with varying intercepts and slopes for EVdiff. Order effects
have been included as control factors in the regression (not reported). Reported
are raw coefficients (z statistics in parentheses); number of participants were
N=21 and 36 in Studies 1 and 2, respectively. *p<0.05, ***p<0.001. aValues
are in Euro difference.
factor (Table 3). In the second study, we find that decision time,
number of fixations, mean fixation duration, and pupil dilation
increase with EVmean. Regression coefficients provide quantita-
tive estimates for the influence. An increase in mean EV of 1.00C,
for example, increases decision time by 0.197 s, the number of fix-
ations by 0.701, etc. Except for mean fixation duration, we find
trends in the same directions in Study 1, which do not reach
conventional levels of significance, however. It remains unclear
here whether these non-significant results are caused by the lower
power due to reduced sample size or other factors such as the
more systematic gamble construction and the lower variation of
EVmean in Study 1.
Furthermore, we find that decision time, and number of fix-
ations increase with decreasing EVdiff (abs) between gambles in
both studies. Mean fixation duration also increases with decreas-
ing EVdiff (abs) in both studies but only in the first study the effect
reaches conventional significance levels. An increase in EVdiff of
1 C would here result in an decrease in mean fixation duration of
around 2%6.
To further investigate the effect of the EVmean manipulation on
mean fixation durations, we categorized single fixations as short
(<150 ms), medium (≥150 and <500 ms), and long (≥500 ms)
according to their duration (Velichkovsky, 1999; Horstmann et al.,
2009). In both studies (and in both high and low EVmean
gambles) we find mainly medium and short fixations (Study 1:
M short= 42.09%, Mmedium= 54.81%; Study 2: M short= 41.91%,
Mmedium= 55.89%) and only a few long fixations that indicate
more deliberate processing. Mixed effect regressions with propor-
tion of short, medium, and long fixations as dependent variables
and EV mean as predictor indicate that in both studies neither
of the proportions is significantly influenced by EV mean, all
p’s> 0.13.
Influence of probability and outcome on attention
To investigate driving factors for the distribution of attention,
we regressed the amount of fixations toward each outcome on
its probability, its value, and their interaction. As in the regres-
sion reported above, we corrected for the repeated measurement
6We also run all analyses reported in Table 4 including additional interaction effects
of EVmean and EVdiff (abs). As expected, main effects did not change but interac-
tions turned out to be significant and positive for mean fixation duration in Study
1 and for decision time and number of fixations in Study 2.
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Table 3 | Regression models predicting decision time, number of fixations, fixation durations, and pupil dilation by EVmean and EVdiff (abs).
Decision timeb Number of fixations Mean fixation durationc Pupil dilation
Study 1 Study 2 Study 1 Study 2 Study 1 Study 2 Study 1 Study 2
EVmeana 0.0196
(0.29)
0.197***
(5.64)
0.0184
(0.08)
0.701***
(5.62)
−0.0003
(−0.93)
0.0004***
(4.56)
0.0011
(0.88)
0.0016**
(2.81)
EVdiff (abs)a −0.715**
(−2.95)
−0.93***
(−7.09)
−2.363**
(−2.95)
−3.624***
(−7.26)
−0.0042***
(−4.21)
−0.0005
(−0.91)
0.0029
(0.56)
0.0015
(0.53)
Constant 8.891***
(−3.88)
8.871***
(14.92)
33.24***
(9.85)
33.31***
(−7.26)
0.199***
(26.36)
0.197***
(43.69)
0.107***
(5.20)
0.0743***
(7.40)
Observations 1005 1728 1004 1728 1002 1728 995 1682
Random effects model with varying intercepts and slopes for EVmean and EVdiff (abs). Order effects have been included as control factors in the regression (not
reported). Reported are raw coefficients (z statistics in parentheses); number of participants were N=21 and 36 in Studies 1 and 2, respectively. EVdiff (abs) denotes
the absolute (i.e., none-negative) value of the difference between EVs of the gambles. **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. aValues are in Euro (difference). bRegression with log
transformed decision times yield the same conclusions. cThe random effect model failed to calculate the SE and as a result did not provide a stable estimate of the
coefficients.Therefore we report for mean fixation duration a fixed effect model with cluster corrected SE (results and interpretation stay the same for both analysis).
Table 4 | Regression models predicting fixations to outcomes by value
and probability.
Number of fixations
Study 1 Study 2
Valuea 0.0741*** (4.97) 0.0913*** (9.78)
Probabilityb 1.533*** (8.21) 1.707*** (8.30)
Value×probability 0.0685+ (2.03) 0.125*** (7.04)
Constant 5.147*** (10.63) 5.428*** (15.37)
Observations 3892 6793
Random effects model with varying intercepts and slopes for value and prob-
ability. Order and position effects have been included as control factors in the
regression (not reported). Reported are raw coefficients (z statistics in paren-
theses); number of participants were N=21 and 36 in Studies 1 and 2, respec-
tively. +p<0.10, ***p<0.001. aValues are in Euro (centered). bProbabilities vary
between 0 and 1(centered).
design by using a random effects model with random inter-
cept and random slopes for all three predictors. Furthermore
we corrected for display position (i.e., all four combinations of
right/left× up/down) using three display position dummies as
well as for learning effects over trials by including trial number.
In both studies the amount of fixations spent on an outcome
increases with both its probability and the value of the outcome
(Table 4). The interaction of probability and value is significant
in Study 2 and marginally significant in Study 1. Significant main
effects (but no interactions) are also found in regressions using
fixation time as dependent variable (not reported).
Some heuristics models assume interindividual differences in
that persons use qualitatively different strategies to make risky
choices (Payne et al., 1988, 1992; Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999).
These should be reflected in heterogeneity of attention patterns
between individuals. We conducted regressions per individual to
investigate eventual heterogeneity in the effects of probabilities and
outcomes on fixations. Figures 2 and 3 plot the resulting intercepts
against the slopes from these regressions, each dot indicating one
participant. We were thereby mainly interested in slopes. Interest-
ingly, for both effects of probability and value on the number of
fixations almost all participants showed behavior that was quali-
tatively in line with the overall regression results in that slopes for
probabilities and values were positive. Hence, although slopes and
intercepts differ between persons behavior seems to be relatively
homogeneous.
DYNAMIC PERSPECTIVE
Furthermore, we investigated dynamics over the course of decision
making. Some models predict changes in attention. Heuristics,
such as PH and LEX, predict changes of attention from more
important to less important comparisons over time. Most strate-
gies considered here except for PCS (and also the above mentioned
attention drift-diffusion models), however, predict that attention
should be about equally distributed over the two gambles that are
compared. As introduced above, Glöckner and Herbold (2011)
showed an attention bias toward the option chosen later on in risky
choices and gaze-cascade effects, that is a tendency to increasingly
look at options that are later on chosen, have been demonstrated
repeatedly in decisions under certainty (e.g., Shimojo et al., 2003).
We investigate whether we can replicate the attentional bias and
aim to explore in more detail when the bias starts to occur in the
decision process. We expect to find a gaze-cascade effect in risky
choice, in that the attentional bias is particularly driven by late
fixations.
Attentional bias
To investigate the occurrence of an attentional bias over the course
of decision making, the proportion of fixations to the left gamble
is used as the dependent measure. Figure 4 plots the attention pro-
portion against proportional time bins with each bin containing
10% of the absolute decision time per person and decision.
Descriptively, the attentional bias toward the favored gamble
is replicated. In both studies, a strong separation can be seen in
the last third of the decision process (i.e., starting in the seventh
or eighth bin). In both studies, we also consistently see an initial
attention bias to the left which is driven by reading direction.
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FIGURE 3 | Individual regression coefficients for predicting number of fixations by value of outcomes (controlling for probability). Graphs show
intercepts plotted against slopes with positive slopes indicating that the number of fixation increases with value.
To test the results statistically, we regressed the proportion of
fixation to the left gamble on choice (left/right), proportion of time
(i.e., time bins), and their interaction (Table 5). We ran a random
effects regression with random coefficients for intercept and slopes
for all three predictors and included dummies for decision tasks as
control factors. The significant main effect for choice indicates an
overall attention bias in the direction of the chosen option. That
is, if the left gamble was chosen, it was fixated 5–6% more often as
compared to decisions in which the right gamble was chosen. The
significant main effect for proportion of time on fixations to the
left gamble indicates a general shift of fixations from left to right by
22–23% over the time course of decision making, probably driven
by initial left bias due to natural reading order. More importantly,
the significant interaction between choice and proportion of time
indicates a strong gaze-cascade effect and captures the fact that
the attentional bias mainly appears in the last part of the decision
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FIGURE 4 | Proportion of fixations to the left gamble (probabilities and outcomes) over the time course of the decision. Decisions for right vs. left
gamble are depicted by separate lines. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Table 5 | Regression model predicting proportion of fixations to the
left gamble.
Proportion of fixations to the
left gamble
Study 1 Study 2
Choice (0= right 1= left) 5.088*** (3.71) 5.950*** (8.10)
Proportion of timea −22.97*** (−4.79) −22.16*** (−6.11)
Choice×proportion of time 27.24*** (7.56) 22.70*** (9.08)
Constant 47.68*** (15.46) 53.32*** (25.06)
Observations 9564 16944
Random effects model with varying intercepts and slopes for choice, time, and the
interaction. Task effects have been included as control factors in the regression
(not reported). Reported are raw coefficients (z statistics in parentheses); number
of participants were N= 21 and 36 in Studies 1 and 2, respectively. ***p<0.001.
The range of the variable is between 0 and 1 and we used bins of 0.10 for the
analysis (both variables were centered for the analysis). Results stay essentially
the same when excluding extreme values (i.e., p90, p10) or using fixation time
as dependent measure.
process in which the gamble receives attention which is chosen
later on (independent of whether it is presented left or right)7.
7For food choices, Krajbich et al. (2012) additionally report the effect that partici-
pants tend to choose the unlooked-at item if the last fixation was to a much disliked
item. To investigate whether this effect generalizes to gambles, we rerun the regres-
sions reported in Table 5 additionally including a three-way interaction of EVdiff,
choice, and time (also controlling for the respective main effect for EVdiff and the
remaining two-way interaction; all variables centered). The results indicate that
there is a positive interaction effect in study 2 but not study 1, whereby main effects
and other interaction effects are not significantly changed. This lack of support,
however, might be due to the fact that there were no losses involved in our material.
Pupil dilation
As reported above, on the aggregate level, we found that pupil
dilation increased with EVmean, that is, with the stakes involved
in the decision (note, however, that the effect was significant in
Study 2 only). We were now interested in the development of
pupil dilation over time. The measure of dilation peaks used in
the aggregated analysis above is inappropriate for such an analy-
sis of small time-blocks (bins), since no single peaks per time-bin
can be expected. We therefore calculated for each time-bin aver-
age deviation scores in pupil size from the first time-bin. Figure 5
shows that in both studies we observed an increase in pupil dila-
tion over time. Additionally, there was an unexpected early drop
in the second time-bin, which was observed in both studies and
might eventually be caused by brightness changes due to stimulus
onset.
To analyze pupil size development over time statistically, we
regressed pupil dilation scores (i.e., pupil size minus pupil size
in the first bin) on time, EVmean, absolute EVdiff, and their
interactions with time (Table 6). We thereby again used a ran-
dom effects model with intercept and slopes of all five predictors
as random coefficients and controlling for order effects and the
absolute time that passed within the trial. The analysis confirms
that pupil dilation increases over the decision making process. The
main effect for EVmean in Study 2 reproduces the effects from
the overall analysis which used peak dilation scores (see Table 3,
above).
Both in the aggregated and the dynamic analysis, we do not find
a negative effect of EVdiff (abs) on pupil dilation, which stands
in conflict with the findings reported in the introduction of this
paper and fails to support predictions derived from PCS. Note,
however, that in Study 1, EVdiff (abs) is only manipulated for a
small subset of the gambles (i.e., the Holt–Laury gambles), so that
eventual effects might have been hard to detect.
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FIGURE 5 | Pupil dilation over time course of the decision. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals (Note that SEs are estimated assuming
independence within participants since deviation scores are normalized per person and trial).
Table 6 | Regression predicting changes in pupil dilation over the
decision making process.
Pupil dilation
Study 1 Study 2
Proportion of timea 0.0434* (2.00) 0.0179+ (1.82)
EVmeanb 0.000873 (0.80) 0.00105** (3.02)
EVdiff (abs)b 0.00369+ (1.93) 0.0027 (1.27)
Proportion of time×EVmean 0.00674 (1.39) 0.00703 (1.26)
Proportion of time×EVdiff (abs) 0.0140* (2.13) 0.00466(1.41)
Absolute time (in s) 0.00475*** (11.04) 0.0029*** (11.29)
Constant 0.0157 (11.04) −0.00228 (−0.38)
Observations 9953 17427
Random effects model with varying intercepts and slopes for EVmean, EVdif(abs),
time, and the interactions. Order effects have been included as control factors
in the regression (not reported). Reported are raw coefficients (z statistics in
parentheses); number of participants were N=21 and 36 in Studies 1 and 2,
respectively, +p< 0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. aThe range of the vari-
able is between 0 and 1 and we used bins of 0.10 for the analysis (and centered
for the analysis). bValues are in Euro (and centered for the analysis).
Attention toward outcomes vs. probabilities
Changes in preferences for value and probability information dur-
ing the decision can be informative for details of the decision
process and were therefore analyzed as well. As mentioned above,
some heuristics such as PH predict such shifts.
We analyzed the overall attention toward probabilities and out-
comes of the gambles, as well as their development over time using
the probability of fixations to probabilities as dependent measure
(i.e., fixations to probability AOIs divided by fixations to all AOIs).
As Figure 6 shows, participants show a preference for probabilities
very early in the decision process and a preference for outcomes
later on. This is in line with one possible interpretation of DFT,
which puts forward that individuals first have to learn probabil-
ities, which are used later on to guide fixations to outcomes (see
text footnote 3, above).
To investigate these effects statistically, we regressed the pro-
portion of fixations dedicated to probabilities on time-bin, again
using a random effects model and controlling for task and order
(Table 7). The constant indicates that there is a general preference
for value information but the significant main effect points to an
even stronger reversal from preferring probabilities to preferring
value information over the course of decision making.
Direction of information search
Finally, we investigated the direction of information search, which
is one classic approach to investigate decision processes (e.g.,
Payne et al., 1988). As discussed above, WADD mainly predicts
information search within-gambles, whereas heuristics mainly
assume comparisons between gambles. We calculated the num-
ber of transitions within and between gambles as the number
of times in which two subsequent fixations focused on differ-
ent AOIs within the same gamble (within-gamble transition),
as opposed to any AOI of the other gamble (between-gamble
transition).
In line with previous findings (Franco-Watkins and Johnson,
2011; Glöckner and Herbold, 2011), we observe only a small pro-
portion of transitions between gambles. Information search is
mainly conducted within-gambles. We observe on average 5.12
(Study 1)/6.35 (Study 2) transitions between gambles and 14.44
(Study 1)/14.11 (Study 2) transitions within one of the gambles
during each decision trial. We analyze changes in the proportion
of transitions over the time course of decision making using a ran-
dom effects model with randomly varying intercept and slope for
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FIGURE 6 | Proportion of fixations to probabilities by time. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Table 7 | Regression model predicting proportion of fixation to
probability information over time.
Proportion of fixations to
probability information
Study 1 Study 2
Proportion of time (10%-steps)a −14.69*** (−3.74) −20.26*** (−7.61)
Constant 47.93*** (17.35) 49.62*** (23.90)
Observations 9428 16685
Random effects model with varying intercepts and slopes for time. Order effects
have been included as control factors in the regression (not reported). Reported
are raw coefficients (z statistics in parentheses); number of participants were
N= 21 and 36 in Studies 1 and 2, respectively. ***p<0.001. aThe range of the
variable is between 0 and 1 and we used bins of 0.10 for the analysis.
the time trend. Findings for both studies indicate that there is no
change in the proportion of fixations by time (both z ’s< 1.16)8.
SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND THEORY PREDICTIONS
A summary of the core results from the two reported eye-tracking
studies with respect to the predictions of the theories that were
considered in the current paper is provided in Table 8.
DISCUSSION
The current paper presents two studies which extend research on
the cognitive mechanisms involved in risky choices with a spe-
cial focus on dynamics, that is, changes in information search
8In this analysis, the application of a fixed effects model leads to different conclusions
in that within gamble transitions increase over time in Study 2 (b= 2.8, z = 3.01,
p< 0.001). Due to the inconsistency in analyses this result has to be interpreted
cautiously. Note also that the finding conflicts with an opposite results by Glöckner
and Herbold (2011).
and processing over the time course of decision making. Eye-
tracking is used to measure different indicators for information
search and integration over time with the aim to test assumptions
and predictions of existing process models for decision making to
inspire further improvements and development within or outside
the frameworks previously suggested.
In line with previous research (e.g., Glöckner and Betsch, 2008a;
Ayal and Hochman, 2009; Glöckner and Herbold, 2011; Hilbig
and Glöckner, 2011), we observed relatively short decision times,
which speaks against the hypothesis that individuals deliberately
integrate probabilities and outcomes according to a calculation of
weighted sums. Note, that particularly in the second study we used
randomly generated gambles that made calculations quite hard.
Take for example the decision between Gamble A, which pays 9.3C
with 20% and 0.4C otherwise vs. Gamble B which pays 3.8C with
88% and 2.2C otherwise. Even for mathematically skilled persons
it seems hard to assume that they can deliberately calculate and
compare the EVs of these Gambles within less than 10 s9. Never-
theless, participants’ choices are still significantly predicted by the
difference in EV between gambles and both outcomes and prob-
abilities influence information search for almost all participants,
which indicates that persons take into account value and probabil-
ities and seem to integrate them to some degree. Additionally, we
find mainly short and medium fixations over the entire time course
of decision making, which supports the notion of individuals at
least partially utilizing automatic processes in risky choice. DFT
and PCS models describe possible process implementation that
9Note, that our manipulation of EVmean was partially confounded with mathe-
matical complexity when assuming deliberate serial calculation of EVs. Specifically,
gamble comparisons with high as compared to low mean EV also involve higher
numbers that could make calculation harder and therefore increase decision time,
number of fixations and arousal. Although we cannot completely rule out this possi-
bility, we argue that given our findings concerning choices, decision time and process
measures deliberate stepwise calculations of EV are not very likely in the first place.
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Table 8 | Summary of the results.
Findings Predicted by
DFT PCS PH Minimax Maximax LEX WADD
Decision time increases with Higher EVmean Yes Yes No No No No No
Lower EVdiff Yes Yes No No No No No
Average number of fixations increases with Higher EVmean Yes Yes No No No No No
Lower EVdiff Yes Yes No No No No No
Mean fixation duration increases with Higher EVmean Results are not conclusive
Lower EVdiff Yes Yes No No No No No
Pupil dilation increases with Higher EVmean Yes Yes No No No No No
Lower EVdiff Results are not conclusive
Attention increases with probability Yes Yes No No No Yes No
Attention increases with value No Yes No No Yes No No
Attention shift toward the chosen option No Yes No No No No No
Mainly within-gambles information search Unsp. Unsp. No No No No Yes
Pupil dilation increases over the time course of the decision Yes No Unsp. Unsp. Unsp. Unsp. Unsp.
Unsp.=unspecified.
approximate weighted integration without relying on the unrea-
sonable assumption that individuals indeed calculate them in a
serial manner.
Quick decision responses could, of course, also be explained
by simple heuristics. Considering that Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier
(2011) start their definition of heuristics as follows: “A heuristic is
a strategy that ignores part of the information. . .,” the high average
proportion of inspected information (i.e., 93%) speaks against this
explanation. Also the interpretation that persons scan all pieces of
information but later on ignore parts of it in their decision process
seems to conflicts with the data since probabilities and values of
outcomes influence attention for almost all participants. Further-
more, individuals show mainly within-gamble information search
and are sensitive to manipulations of EV which also speaks against
the application of simple heuristics.
We manipulated mean EV and EV difference between gambles
of the decision problems to investigate whether individuals’ reac-
tions to these manipulations can be better explained by one of the
models considered. Indicators for information search and process-
ing are influenced by both manipulations. Deciding about gambles
with somewhat higher stakes (i.e., higher mean EV) results in
longer decision times, a more comprehensive information search
(amount of fixations), deeper processing (mean length of a sin-
gle fixation), and signs of increased arousal and/or cognitive load
(greater pupil dilation). However, not only the stakes of a gam-
ble influence the processing, but also the overall similarity of the
two gambles in the choice pair, as indicated by the absolute EV
difference. Deciding between two gambles that are very close to
each other with respect to EV was associated with an increase in
decision times and number of fixations, as well as a larger average
fixation duration. Summing up the evidence, we observe that indi-
viduals make choices in less then 10 s and thereby take into account
almost all pieces of information. Choice behavior is thereby highly
sensitive to manipulations in EVmean and EVdiff, which arguably
requires individuals quickly to develop rough impressions of the
EVs of the gambles considered.
Since individuals seem to integrate many available pieces of
information in a fast automatic response, these results provide evi-
dence in favor of automatic integration models such as PCS and
DFT. Results do not fit with the assumptions of simple heuristics
ignoring parts of the information presented, or the much slower
serial integration of information proposed by WADD.
Since most process models provide predictions about the dis-
tribution of attention, we used the amount of fixations on each
outcome as a dependent measure. We were able to show that the
look-up rate of an outcome depends on the value and the proba-
bility of an outcome and that most individuals show these effects.
This result is challenging not only for heuristics, which often pre-
dict that attention is mainly driven by the value of an outcome
(i.e., minimax and maximax), but also for models like DFT which
assume that the attention to an outcome is only driven by its proba-
bility. Only PCS among the models considered here, which predicts
holistic integration of all presented information, could account for
the influence of both value and probability of an outcome on the
attention devoted to it.
The results from both of our studies as well as evidence from
previous research (Glöckner and Betsch, 2008a; Johnson et al.,
2008; Franco-Watkins and Johnson, 2011; Glöckner and Herbold,
2011), show that within-gamble comparisons were much more
frequent than between-gamble comparisons in these two-outcome
risky choice tasks. This result supports WADD, but speaks against
simple heuristics, which assume mainly attribute-wise compar-
isons between the gambles. DFT and PCS do not predict a specific
direction of information search, and we suggest extending and
specifying them by adding testable models of information search
to increase their empirical content (Glöckner and Betsch, 2011).
DYNAMIC PERSPECTIVE
A more in-depth analysis of attention processes across the time
course of decision making is unique to this study. To pin-point
dynamics in the process, we analyzed changes in the distribution
of attention between outcomes and probabilities, changes in pupil
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dilation, as well as the attention biases toward one of the options
as the decision process unfolded.
Individuals preferred looking at probability information in the
very beginning of a decision. During the middle and later parts
of the decision, however, individuals focused more strongly on
outcome information. This shift in attention toward outcome
information is in line with the assumption of DFT that proba-
bility information informs later on sampling of outcomes. It is
hard to explain with most simple heuristics. PCS does not make
clear predictions concerning this shift.
We also observed an attention bias toward the preferred option
occurring in the later part of decision making showing the gaze-
cascade effect for risky choices. This could be due to fixations
toward the later chosen gamble within the decision making process
or fixations in order to confirm the choice. Furthermore, pupil
dilations increased over time in both studies, which can be inter-
preted as an accumulation of arousal over the information search
process, which could be explained by DFT.
MODELS FOR RISKY CHOICES
The evidence presented in this paper advances our understand-
ing of the time course of risky choice as well as the underlying
processes. Results generally seem to support automatic integration
models. Nevertheless, neither DFT nor PCS can in their current
specifications fully account for all findings. In particular, with
regard to DFT, the assumption of a stochastic sampling and evi-
dence accumulation process directed by probabilities of outcomes
can only be partially supported. The results at hand show that the
probability of an outcome occurring is an important factor for
the distribution of attention as predicted by DFT. However, it is
not the only factor influencing information sampling. The value
of an outcome influences the allocation of attention as well. Some
implementations of DFT also assume that the allocation of atten-
tion between gambles should be constant over the entire decision
process, which is not in line with our finding of an emerging bias
toward the actually chosen option over time (i.e., the gaze-cascade
effect). Other implementations of evidence accumulation models
such as the attention drift-diffusion model (e.g., Krajbich et al.,
2012), however, could account for such effects, at least when they
concern last fixations only.
Concerning PCS the results are somewhat equivocal as well. The
results concerning the attention bias and the gaze-cascade effect in
risky choice strongly support the idea of systematic information
distortions, particularly the accentuation of initial advantages of
one option over time (Thagard, 1989; Holyoak and Simon, 1999;
Simon et al., 2004; Glöckner and Herbold, 2011). Also the find-
ings concerning the effects of EVmean on information search and
arousal are in line with the models predictions and replicate and
extend previous findings. However, it has to be qualified that the
by PCS predicted and previously observed (Glöckner et al., 2012)
effect of EVdiff on arousal was not found in the current studies.
Also the observed increase in arousal over the time course of deci-
sion making is hard to explain with the PCS model. Furthermore,
it has to be criticized that the PCS framework is currently not
sufficiently specified to predict all information search parameters.
Therefore, it seems necessary to extend the model by modeling
information search more explicitly. The current findings, which
provide a closer view of the choice process, can inform such model
developments.
CAVEATS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
As already addressed in the introduction, one concern with regards
to the method used in our experiment and the interpretations
derived from our results could be that data from eye-tracking
potentially provides only a vague proxy for the information search
and processing, because it might neglect internal processes of
attention and information retrieval. This would, for example, be
the case if individuals look-up information only once and retrieve
it from memory at a later stage of the decision making process.
However, two arguments can be made against this objection: First,
the current design (as opposed, for example, to mouselab) enabled
effortless visual retrieval of information, making retrieval from
memory unnecessary. Second, participants did actually constantly
and systematically sample visual information across the entire
decision process. These considerations allow for more faith in the
methods, findings, and conclusions of the current study.
We could not replicate the previously observed effect of EV
differences on arousal (Glöckner et al., 2012). For deeper under-
standing, we therefore strongly encourage further studies of the
link between the decision task difficulty and observed arousal or
cognitive load. Investigating the connection with additional mea-
sures, like skin conductance, could help to clarify the role of arousal
and the driving factors.
Besides investigations of a methodological nature, a next step
in analyzing information search and arousal should be replica-
tions of these findings in different decision making contexts by,
on the one hand, changing the structure of the gamble tasks into
more than two-outcome gambles and, on the other hand, using
less abstract risky choices in order to test whether the result also
holds for affect richer decisions and can therefore be generalized
to risky decisions in the “real world”(see i.e., Goldstein and Weber,
1995, for a discussion of this caveat).
CONCLUSION
Given our results and evidence from previous studies (see Glöck-
ner and Herbold, 2011), simple non-compensatory models such
as the PH, LEX, minimax, or maximax heuristic do not seem to be
appropriate to predict search behavior and processes involved in
risky decisions in general. The same holds for the serial implemen-
tations of EU models in the form of WADD. Instead, the present
results suggest that risky decision making seems to rely mainly
on automatic-intuitive processes and can be partially described
by models such as DFT and PCS. Nevertheless, also these models
cannot account for all our findings in that they are underspecified
in some respects and make no predictions or even make predic-
tions which are clearly not in line with the findings. Since none of
our findings, however, directly challenges core properties of these
models, and also due to a lack of better alternatives, we think that
both kinds of models are promising starting points for further
theory developments concerning process models of risky choice.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online
at http://www.frontiersin.org/Cognitive_Science/10.3389/fpsyg.
2012.00335/abstract
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APPENDIX
SUMMARY STATISTICS
Table A1 provides the descriptive statistics for the core dependent measures.
Table A1 | Summary statistic for the main dependent variables (SD).
Study 1 Study 2
Pupil size (radius in mm) 2.49 (0.43) 2.26 (0.30)
Pupil dilation (radius in mm) 0.122 (0.133) 0.095 (0.11)
Decision time (in s) 8.98 (6.27) 9.29 (5.99)
Proportion of inspected information (in %)a 93.92 (13.57) 96.01 (9.42)
Mean fixation duration (in s) 0.196 (0.040) 0.194 (0.033)
Number of fixations per decision 33.48 (21.01) 34.99 (21.26)
Number of transitions between information pieces 19.35 (11.56) 20.33 (11.99)
Transitions within-gambles (in %)b 74.15 (13.81) 69.48 (13.75)
Proportion of long fixations (in %)c 3.08 (1.73) 2.20 (1.4)
aProportion of AOIs fixated per trial, eight pieces of information are presented each trial.
bReference class are all direct transitions between AOIs, re-fixations within the same AOI are dropped.
cLong fixations are fixation >500 ms and the reference class are all identified fixations.
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GAMBLES STUDY 1
Table A2 shows the 50 decision tasks used in study 1. Each Choice consists of two gambles A and B with two possible outcomes (and
their probabilities). In the presentation, the positions of gambles and outcomes were varied according to a fixed random design.
Table A2 | Decision tasks used in study 1.
Decision Gamble A Gamble B EVA EVB EVmean EVdiff (abs)
1 0C (0.60)/20C (0.40) 10C (0.40)/6.67C (0.60) 8 8 8 0
2 4C (0.50)/3C (0.50) 0C (0.30)/5C (0.70) 3.5 3.5 3.5 0
3 1C (0.45)/4C (0.55) 4.4C (0.60)/0C (0.40) 2.65 2.64 2.645 0.01
4 10C (0.7)/4C (0.3) 10.25C (0.80)/0C (0.20) 8.2 8.2 8.2 0
5 10.5C (0.50)/0.5C (0.50) 11C (0.75)/0C (0.25) 8.25 8.25 8.25 0
6 0C (0.30)/12C (0.70) 10C (0.60)/6C (0.40) 8.4 8.4 8.4 0
7 7.5C (0.50)/0C (0.50) 2C (0.65)/7C (0.35) 3.75 3.75 3.75 0
8 3.3C (0.40)/2.25C (0.60) 4C (0.67)/0C (0.33) 2.67 2.68 2.675 0.01
9 0C (0.40)/16C (0.60) 22.5C (0.40)/1C (0.60) 9.6 9.6 9.6 0
10 4.5C (0.70)/0C (0.30) 0.3C (0.50)/6C (0.50) 3.15 3.15 3.15 0
11 5C (0.60)/0C (0.40) 0.4C (0.55)/6.2C (0.45) 3 3 3 0
12 11.5C (0.70)/0.6C (0.30) 10.3C (0.80)/0C (0.20) 8.23 8.24 8.235 0.01
13 0C (0.25)/11.35C (0.75) 16.25C (0.50)/0.75C(0.50) 8.51 8.5 8.505 0.01
14 0.4C (0.60)/7.3C (0.40) 0C (0.30)/4.5C (0.70) 3.16 3.15 3.155 0.01
15 0C (0.50)/4C (0.50) 0.39C (0.65)/5C (0.35) 2 2 2 0
16 11.27C (0.67)/0C (0.33) 0.6C (0.60)/18C (0.40) 7.55 7.56 7.555 0.01
17 2C (0.50)/3.4C (0.50) 2.5C (0.60)/3C (0.40) 2.7 2.7 2.7 0
18 2C (0.60)/5.25C (0.40) 3C (0.70)/4C (0.30) 3.3 3.3 3.3 0
19 6.6C (0.55)/11C (0.45) 8.8C (0.60)/8.25C (0.40) 8.58 8.58 8.58 0
20 10C (0.75)/6C (0.25) 10C (0.50)/8C (0.50) 9 9 9 0
21 9C (0.50)/7.5C (0.50) 5C (0.35)/10C (0.65) 8.25 8.25 8.25 0
22 4.4C (0.65)/15.4C (0.35) 5.5C (0.50)/11 C (0.50) 8.25 8.25 8.25 0
23 5.25C (0.40)/2C (0.60) 4C (0.30)/3C (0.70) 3.3 3.3 3.3 0
24 3.45C (0.50)/1C (0.50) 0.5C (0.60)/4.8 C (0.40) 2.22 2.22 2.22 0
25 49.5C (0.10)/5.5C (0.90) 10C (0.99)/0C (0.01) 9.9 9.9 9.9 0
26 0C (0.02)/9.44 C (0.98) 4.7C (0.85)/35 C (0.15) 9.25 9.25 9.25 0
27 1.35C (0.90)/12.5C (0.10) 0C (0.01)/2.5C (0.99) 2.46 2.47 2.47 0.01
28 0C (0.02)/3C (0.98) 13.1C (0.1)/1.8C (0.9) 2.94 2.93 2.94 0.01
29 34C (0.15)/3.5C (0.85) 8.3C (0.98)/0.1C (0.02) 8.07 8.14 8.11 0.07
30 2.25C (0.98)/0.1C (0.02) 9C (0.15)/1C (0.85) 2.21 2.2 2.20 0.01
31 2.5C (0.99)/0.3C (0.01) 12.2C (0.10)/1.4C (0.90) 2.48 2.48 2.48 0
32 9C (0.98)/0C (0.02) 34.3C (0.10)/6C (0.90) 8.82 8.83 8.825 0.01
33 2.9C (0.98)/3.2C (0.02) 1.3C (0.85)/12C (0.15) 2.91 2.91 2.91 0
34 3.8.C (0.85)/34 C (0.15) 8.3C (0.98)/10 C (0.02) 8.33 8.33 8.33 0
35 1.44C (0.85)/12C (0.15) 3C (0.98)/4C (0.02) 3.02 3.02 3.02 0
36 4.58C (0.80)/22C (0.20) 15C (0.01)/8C (0.99) 8.07 8.07 8.07 0
37 17.2C (0.15)/0.5C (0.85) 3.2C (0.01)/3C (0.99) 3 3 3 0
38 31.2C (0.20)/2.8C (0.80) 8.5C (0.99)/7.5C (0.01) 8.48 8.49 8.485 0.1
39 0.9C (0.80)/33.9C (0.20) 8C (0.01)/7.5C (0.99) 7.5 7.5 7.5 0
40 22.5C (0.15)/0.5C (0.85) 2.15C (0.98)/2.3C (0.02) 3.8 2.153 2.98 1.65
41 3.2C (0.90)/4C (0.10) 7.7C (0.10)/0.2C (0.90) 3.28 0.95 2.12 2.33
42 3.2C (0.80)/4C (0.20) 7.7C (0.20)/0.2C (0.80) 3.36 1.7 2.53 1.66
43 3.2C (0.70)/4C (0.30) 7.7C (0.30)/0.2C (0.70) 3.44 2.45 2.95 0.99
44 3.2C (0.60)/4C (0.40) 7.7C (0.40)/0.2C (0.60) 3.52 3.2 3.36 0.32
45 3.2C (0.50)/4C (0.50) 7.7C (0.50)/0.2C (0.50) 3.6 3.95 3.78 0.35
46 3.2C (0.40)/4C (0.60) 7.7C (0.60)/0.2C (0.40) 3.68 4.7 4.19 1.02
47 3.2C (0.30)/4C (0.70) 7.7C (0.70)/0.2C (0.30) 3.76 5.45 4.61 1.69
48 3.2C (0.20)/4C (0.80) 7.7C (0.80)/0.2C (0.20) 3.84 6.2 5.02 2.36
49 3.2C (0.10)/4C (0.90) 7.7C (0.90)/0.2C (0.10) 3.92 6.95 5.44 3.03
50 3.2C (0.00)/4C (0.1) 7.7C (1)/0.2C (0.00) 4 7.7 5.85 3.70
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Table A3 shows the 50 decision tasks used in study 2. Each Choice consists of two gambles A and B with two possible outcomes (and
their probabilities). In the presentation, the positions of gambles and outcomes were varied according to a fixed random design.
Table A3 | Decision tasks used in study 2.
Decision Gamble A Gamble B EVA EVB EVmean EVdiff (abs)
1 2.4C (0.75)/0.8 C (0.25) 3.4C (0.49)/0.8 C (0.51) 2 2.07 2.04 0.07
2 2.2C (0.82)/2.8C (0.18) 2C (0.16)/2.3C (0.84) 2.31 2.25 3.44 0.06
3 9.5C (0.2)/0.6C (0.8) 2.6C (0.88)/1C (0.12) 2.38 2.41 2.40 0.03
4 1C (0.72)/7.8C (0.28) 2.3C (0.77)/4.6C (0.23) 2.90 2.83 2.87 0.07
5 1.2C (0.76)/5.3C (0.24) 0.9C (0.2)/2.4 C (0.8) 2.18 2.10 2.14 0.08
6 7C (0.23)/1.5C (0.77) 1.9C (0.85)/8.1C (0.15) 2.77 2.83 2.80 0.06
7 1.8C (0.03)/2.4C (0.97) 2.5C (0.69)/2.1C (0.31) 2.38 2.38 2.38 0
8 6.8C (0.18)/1C (0.82) 3.9C (0.14)/1.8C (0.86) 2.04 2.09 2.07 0.05
9 2.7C (0.66)/2.9C (0.34) 1.5C (0.73)/6.3C (0.27) 2.77 2.80 2.79 0.03
10 4C (0.1)/1.9C (0.9) 6.2C (0.16)/1.3C (0.84) 2.11 2.08 2.10 0.03
11 14.4C (0.75)/4.8C (0.25) 20.4C (0.49)/4.8C (0.51) 12 12.44 12.22 0.44
12 13.2C (0.82)/16.8C (0.18) 12C (0.16)/13.8C (0.84) 13.85 13.51 13.68 0.34
13 57C (0.2)/3.6C (0.8) 15.6C (0.88)/6C (0.12) 14.28 14.45 14.37 0.17
14 6C (0.72)/46.8C (0.28) 13.8C (0.77)/27.6C (0.23) 17.42 16.97 17.20 0.45
15 7.2C (0.76)/31.8C (0.24) 5.4C (0.2)/14.4C (0.8) 13.10 12.60 12.85 0.50
16 42C (0.23)/9C (0.77) 11.4C (0.85)/48.6C (0.15) 16.59 16.98 16.79 0.39
17 10.8C (0.03)/14.4C (0.97) 15C (0.69)/12.6C (0.31) 14.29 14.26 14.28 0.04
18 40.8C (0.18)/6C (0.82) 23.4C (0.14)/10.8 C (0.86) 12.26 12.56 12.41 0.30
19 16.2C (0.66)/17.4C (0.34) 9C (0.73)/37.8 C (0.27) 16.61 16.78 16.69 0.17
20 24C (0.1)/11.4C (0.9) 37.2C (0.16)/7.8C (0.84) 12.66 12.50 12.58 0.16
21 2.2C (0.75)/0.6C (0.25) 4.6C (0.49)/2C (0.51) 1.80 3.27 2.54 1.47
22 2C (0.82)/2.6C (0.18) 3.2C (0.16)/3.5C (0.84) 2.11 3.45 2.78 1.34
23 9.3C (0.2)/0.4C (0.8) 3.8C (0.88)/2.2C (0.12) 2.18 3.61 2.90 1.43
24 0.8C (0.72)/7.6C (0.28) 3.5C (0.77)/5.8C (0.23) 2.70 4.03 3.40 1.33
25 1C (0.76)/5.1C (0.24) 2.1C (0.2)/3.6C (0.8) 1.98 3.30 2.64 1.32
26 6.8C (0.23)/1.3C (0.77) 3.1C (0.85)/9.3C (0.15) 2.57 4.03 3.30 1.46
27 1.6C (0.03)/2.2C (0.97) 3.7C (0.69)/3.3C (0.31) 2.18 3.58 2.88 1.40
28 6.6C (0.18)/0.8C (0.82) 5.1C (0.14)/3C (0.86) 1.84 3.29 2.57 1.45
29 2.5C (0.66)/2.7C (0.34) 2.7C (0.73)/7.5C (0.27) 2.57 4 3.28 1.43
30 3.8C (0.1)/1.7C (0.9) 7.4C (0.16)/2.5C (0.84) 1.91 3.28 2.60 1.37
31 14.2C (0.75)/4.6C (0.25) 21.6C (0.49)/6C (0.51) 11.80 13.64 12.72 1.84
32 13C (0.82)/16.6C (0.18) 13.2C (0.16)/15C (0.84) 13.65 14.71 14.18 1.06
33 56.8C (0.2)/3.4C (0.8) 16.8C (0.88)/7.2C (0.12) 14.08 15.65 14.87 1.57
34 5.8C (0.72)/46.6C (0.28) 15C (0.77)/28.8 C (0.23) 17.22 18.17 17.70 0.95
35 7C (0.76)/31.6 C (0.24) 6.6C (0.2)/15.6C (0.8) 12.90 13.80 13.35 0.90
36 41.8C (0.23)/8.8C (0.77) 12.6C (0.85)/49.8 C (0.15) 16.39 18.18 17.30 1.79
37 10.8C (0.03)/14.2C (0.97) 16.2C (0.69)/13.8 C (0.31) 14.09 15.46 14.77 1.36
38 40.6C (0.18)/5.8C (0.82) 24.6C (0.14)/12C (0.86) 12.06 13.76 12.91 1.7
39 16C (0.66)/17.2C (0.34) 10.2C (0.73)/39C (0.27) 16.41 17.98 17.20 1.57
40 23.8C (0.1)/11.2C (0.9) 38.4C (0.16)/9C (0.84) 12.46 13.70 13.08 1.24
41 3.2C (0.90)/4C (0.10) 7.7C (0.10)/0.2C (0.90) 3.28 0.95 2.12 2.33
42 3.2C (0.80)/4C (0.20) 7.7C (0.20)/0.2C (0.80) 3.36 1.70 2.53 1.66
43 3.2C (0.70)/4C (0.30) 7.7C (0.30)/0.2C (0.70) 3.44 2.45 3 0.99
44 3.2C (0.60)/4C (0.40) 7.7C (0.40)/0.2C (0.60) 3.52 3.20 3.36 0.32
45 3.2C (0.50)/4C (0.50) 7.7C (0.50)/0.2C (0.50) 3.60 3.95 3.78 0.35
46 3.2C (0.40)/4C (0.60) 7.7C (0.60)/0.2C (0.40) 3.68 4.70 4.19 1.02
47 3.2C (0.30)/4C (0.70) 7.7C (0.70)/0.2C (0.30) 3.76 5.45 4.61 1.69
48 3.2C (0.20)/4C (0.80) 7.7C (0.80)/0.2C (0.20) 3.84 6.20 5.02 2.36
49 3.2C (0.10)/4C (0.90) 7.7C (0.90)/0.2C (0.10) 3.92 6.95 5.44 3.03
50 3.2C (0.00)/4C (0.1) 7.7C (1)/0.2C (0.00) 4 7.70 5.85 3.70
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